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THE THREE INDEPENDENCES
H. Jefferson Powell *
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of judicial independence is, of course, an especially
fitting one for us to consider as we gather to honor Chief Justice
Carrico. On many occasions, I am sure, he has had cause to re-
flect on the meaning and purpose of an independent judiciary,
and I hope that my observations are ones that he will find consis-
tent with his own experience of the actual workings of the Ameri-
can legal system.
At first glance, however, one might worry that the fundamental
notion of judicial independence is too uncontroversial to repay
close attention. Surely we can expect rather little in the way of
dissent. The independence of the judiciary is a commonplace, a
settled presupposition of the constitutional system of government
in the United States. It is, I suppose, always possible to find
someone, somewhere who will dispute any proposition, but in the
context of our Republic and our legal system and profession, it
would sound more eccentric than interesting if one of today's
speakers simply denounced judicial independence as a bad idea.
In the early twenty-first century, the truly controversial issues
relating to the independence of the courts are to be found in the
sometimes troubled relationship between that independence and
other political principles and practices in our system-the elec-
tion of judges in many states, for example, or the role of the
United States Senate in the appointment of federal judges. The
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. B.A., 1975, St. David's University
College, University of Wales; A.M., 1977, Duke University; M. Div., 1979, Yale Divinity
School; J.D., 1982, Yale Law School; Ph.D, 1991, Duke University. I am most grateful to
the Honorable Donald W. Lemons for his comments and encouragement.
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existence and fundamental value of judicial independence per se
are not generally in dispute.
Other speakers in today's symposium will address some of
these questions that are currently at the forefront of discussion
and debate. My task, however, is to ask you to spend some time
thinking about what I have just been calling commonplaces, set-
tled presuppositions, and matters free of controversy. Doing so
will not be pointless and I hope it will not be boring. The problem
with a legal or political practice or principle becoming uncontro-
versial is that we can, bit by bit, without noticing that we are do-
ing so, lose a clear sense of what the point of the practice is, or
what the principle really means. It is no bad thing every so often
to take out our shared presuppositions and ask why we presup-
pose them, and whether we are truly acting in accordance with
them or just paying them lip service. What seems simple or obvi-
ous may turn out to be more complicated than it first appears. In
drafting the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson
charged King George III with the political crime of "ma[king]
Judges dependent on his Will alone,"' and Jefferson was almost
as harsh in his criticism of the Virginia state legislature's domi-
nation of the state courts under the Commonwealth's original
constitution.2 But Jefferson also wrote that judicial "independ-
ence of the will of the nation is a solecism, at least in a republican
government."3 In my remarks I propose that we explore the com-
plexity that Jefferson's comments suggest, that we consider the
questions of what judicial independence really means, and what
its purpose or purposes are.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10 (U.S. 1776).
2. For Jefferson's criticism of the dependence of the post-revolutionary Virginia
courts on the legislature, see Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 13,
120-21 (1784), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 319-20 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 171 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899).
[Vol. 38:603
THE THREE INDEPENDENCES
II. BLACKSTONE AND TUCKER: DEFINING THE VALUE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Let us start where founding-era lawyers often began, with
Blackstone. In the first volume of the Commentaries, Blackstone
wrote:
In th[e] distinct and separate existence of the judicial power, in a pe-
culiar body of men ... consists one main preservative of the public
liberty; which cannot subsist long in any state, unless the admini-
stration of common justice be in some degree separated both from
the legislative and also from the executive power. Were it joined with
the legislative, the life, liberty, and property, of the subject would be
in the hands of arbitrary judges, whose decisions would be then
regulated only by their own opinions, and not by any fundamental
principles of law .... Were it joined with the executive, this union
might soon be an overballance for the legislative.
4
It will repay us to linger a few moments over what Blackstone
is saying here. As a preliminary matter, let us recall what he isn't
saying. Blackstone firmly rejected any notion that a court could
disregard or set aside an act of Parliament; for him judicial inde-
pendence depended not at all on any power of judicial review of
legislation.' In that respect, the great commentator differed from
his American disciples. From The Federalist on, the Founders
cited the courts' power of constitutional review as one of the ra-
tionales for judicial independence.6 But, as I hope to show, the
Founders followed Blackstone in identifying other factors as cru-
cial to the case for judicial independence.
Blackstone defined the value of judicial independence primarily
in terms of the dangers of its absence. If the judicial power were
"joined with the legislative," he warned, "life, liberty, and prop-
erty ... would be in the hands of arbitrary judges," and decisions
would be "regulated only by [the] opinions" of the decisionmakers
4. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *259-60.
5. 1 id. at *259.
6. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (stating that ascertaining the meaning of laws and constitutions is the courts'
proper province).
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"and not by any fundamental principles of law."7 But why? Black-
stone commented, to be sure, that "legislators may depart from,
yet judges are bound to observe" the "fundamental principles of
law,"' but Blackstone, remember, didn't have a concept of judicial
review of legislation, and if the legislators enact arbitrary or op-
pressive laws, the judges' only choice, in his view, would be to en-
force those laws.9 Something else must be going on. A bit later in
this passage, Blackstone expressed the danger that the assimila-
tion or subordination of the judiciary to the executive would in-
cline the judges "to pronounce that for law, which was most
agreeable to the prince or his officers." ° It is a reasonable fear,
but it wasn't his first or seemingly his most weighty argument
which was, in the language I've already quoted, that the union of
judicial and executive power "might soon be an overballance for
the legislature."" Again, something else is at stake beyond the
danger of arbitrary decisions in themselves, important as that
may be. There is, I think, some distinct and fundamental signifi-
cance for Blackstone in the independence of the judiciary that is
linked directly and positively to the distinction he draws between
the legislature and the executive. 2 Judicial independence, in
short, is grounded in a more general view of the necessary sepa-
ration of powers, in what he called a bit later in his discussion "a
free constitution."13
All of Blackstone's arguments for judicial independence are
picked up and amplified by leading American Founders, including
the link we've just seen between judicial independence and the
overall goal of separating and dividing governmental power.
James Madison in The Federalist, for example, wrote that "[t]he
accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judici[al] in
the same hands... may justly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny,"'4 quite apart, it would seem, from any specific ways
in which such unified powers might be misused. The most sugges-
7. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at *259.
8. 1 id.
9. See 1 id. (noting that judges, unlike legislators, are bound to observe fundamental
principles of law).
10. 1 id. at *260.
11. 1 id.
12. See 1 id. at *259--60 (stating that the judicial branch is unique because of its
separate existence and its look of susceptibility to the crown).
13. 1 id. at *260.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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tive founding-era discussions of why this is so are those of St.
George Tucker, the great Virginia judge and legal scholar, whose
1803 American edition of Blackstone's Commentaries was a mile-
stone in the development of American legal thought." In part,
Tucker traveled over familiar ground, repeating all of the prag-
matic points that Blackstone and others had made. As Tucker put
it in 1803, judicial independence is "absolutely necessary" to en-
able the courts to make decisions, "without the hope of pleasing,
or the fear of offending" the legislative or executive branches.
16
And, like his fellow Americans, Tucker added to these arguments
the existence of judicial review as a reason for protecting judicial
independence.17 But he went beyond earlier discussions by giving
clearer content to the idea that judicial independence is a specific
and vital aspect of the structure of constitutional government it-
self.18
Judicial independence, Tucker asserted in his 1803 edition of
Blackstone's Commentaries, stems from "the letter of the [federal]
constitution which defines and limits the powers of the several co-
ordinate branches of the government" 9 and does so, most funda-
mentally, by securing to each branch "the free exercise of their
constitutional functions." ° The key words here are "defines" and
"functions." For Tucker, the courts ought to be independent be-
cause, by definition, what courts do-their "function"-is distinct
from the functions of legislatures and executive officers. Tucker
was echoing something he had written in his great opinion in the
case of Kamper v. Hawkins,2 decided in 1793. The constitution
(meaning the Virginia Constitution on that occasion) makes "the
legislative, executive, and judiciary.., separate and distinct,"
therefore, "neither [ought to] exercise the powers properly be-
long[ing] to the other."22 Judges are independent for the same
reason that executive officers and legislators are independent-
because what each branch does is in some core way distinctive
15. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Philadelphia, Birch &
Small 1803).
16. 1 id. app. at 359.
17. See 1 id. (discussing the importance of the complete independence of the judici-
ary).
18. 1 id.
19. 1 id. app. at 354.
20. 1 id. app. at 359.
21. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
22. Id. at 79 (Tucker, J., seriatim opinion).
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and unique. The reason that a system of imperfectly separated
powers is tyrannical by definition is that such a system permits a
department of the government to carry out or control a function
that it is ill-suited to exercise in due responsibility to the people.
For Tucker, in other words, it is quite wrong to think of the courts
as less "responsible" than the so-called political branches.23
That absolute independence of the judiciary, for which we con-
tend, is not then incompatible with the strictest responsibility;
"for a judge is no more exempt from [such responsibility] than any
other servant of the people, according to the true principles of the
constitution. 24
Tucker's answer to Jefferson's worry, quoted earlier, is that
judicial independence is the very means of securing the
judiciary's "strictest responsibility"" to the people, not a grant of
independence from "the will of the nation."26  Judicial
independence is the form republican principles take when they
are applied to the shaping and activities of the courts.
III. THE THREE STRANDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
To see how this is so, I think it will be helpful to distinguish
three separate strands in the concept of judicial independence-
"three independences," I am going to call them-each of which I
believe to be part of traditional American constitutional and legal
thought, although the terminology I am going to employ may not
be completely familiar. The American constitutional and legal
tradition expects and requires that the courts possess and act on
independence of position, independence of decision, and independ-
ence of thought. Only where all three of these independences are
present do the courts possess that "absolute independence" that
Tucker and the other Founders believed to be essential to a free
and republican constitution." Any serious lapse in the mainte-
nance of any of these three independences, whether by pressure
from without the courts or failure within, renders the courts de-
23. See id. at 82-84 (Tucker, J., seriatim opinion).
24. 1 TUCKER, supra note 15, app. at 359.
25. 1 id.
26. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, supra note 3, at 171.
27. See 1 TUCKER, supra note 15, app. at 359.
[Vol. 38:603
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pendent in a fashion inimical to their ordained and vital role in
our constitutional system-renders them in fact less responsible
to "the will of the nation.""
Let us turn first to that independence which can most easily be
observed-independence of position. The courts are only truly in-
dependent, our tradition has maintained, when the judges hold
their positions free of personal worry that a decision obnoxious to
the powerful can lead to a loss of position, status, or salary. The
function of adjudication involves by definition the reality that the
judge will give disappointment and offense from time to time, to
unhappy litigants, uncomprehending public opinion, and the
members of the other two branches of government. As Alexander
Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78, an "independent spirit
in the judges ... must be essential to the faithful performance of
so arduous a duty."29 But magistrates, whose positions are in the
control of those they may offend, can hardly be expected in the
long term to disregard the consequences of their decisions. Theo-
retical responsibility to the administration of the people's law
would be overshadowed by de facto subservience to those who
cannot claim to be the people, even if they constitute a momen-
tary popular majority. It is vital, therefore, that in devising free
and republican constitutional structures of government the peo-
ple create such safeguards for the independence of the courts as
will foster the "firmness and independence,"3 "integrity and mod-
eration"31 "of the judicial magistracy."32 "Considerate men of every
description," Hamilton concluded, "ought to prize whatever will
tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts."33 Only if they
possess independence of position can judges truly be responsible
to the people for the execution of their function of impartial and
unbiased judgment in individual cases. On this basis, Hamilton
commended the federal Constitution's provisions ensuring to the
federal judges tenure during good behavior and prohibiting the
diminution of their compensation.34
28. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie, supra note 3, at 171.
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 6, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton).
30. Id. at 523.
31. Id. at 528.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 522-24, 530; THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 531-32 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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Independence of position, then, is concerned with tangible, ex-
ternal threats to the courts' proper exercise of their constitutional
function, and it is secured in the Founders' view by external
structural protections for the individuals who exercise the power
of the courts.35 But I want us to take note of the way in which
Hamilton links these external factors to the internal subjectiv-
ities of the judges-to their "temper" as he puts it. 36
The second strand in the weave making up judicial independ-
ence is what I am calling independence of decision. The courts are
only truly independent, our tradition has maintained, when the
decisions of the judges take effect, are enforceable and enforced,
without circumvention or defiance by legislatures and executive
officers. The function of adjudication involves by definition the ac-
tual resolution of disputes, not the abstract expression of juristic
opinion. (The practice of providing advisory opinions that exists
under some state constitutions is, I think, only an apparent ex-
ception and is in any event a minor one.) Writing in 1800, Madi-
son sharply distinguished an "expression[] of opinion, unaccom-
panied with any other effect than what [it] may produce on
opinion, by exciting reflection" from the decisions of the courts,
which "are carried into immediate effect by force."37 When the ju-
diciary makes decisions, it "enforces the general will, whilst that
will and that opinion continue unchanged."3 No matter how care-
fully and impartially judges interpret the "general will"39 ex-
pressed in constitutional provisions and statutes, their ability to
turn theoretical responsibility to the people into reality will be an
illusion if the executive refuses to execute their judgments or the
legislature subjects their decisions to review, express or de facto,
by non-judicial officers. "For what avails it," Tucker commented,
"that an impartial tribunal have decided" a case in accordance
with the people's law, if the other branches of government can ig-
nore the court?4" Only if they possess this independence of deci-
sion can the judges truly carry out their constitutional function. A
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 6, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton).
36. Id. at 528.
37. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolution, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 346 (Marvin Meyers
ed., rev. ed. 1973).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 1 TUCKER, supra note 15, app. at 352-53.
[Vol. 38:603
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clear and very early example of the necessity for independence of
decision can be seen in the refusal by the federal courts to resolve
claims about the validity of pension claims because their conclu-
sions were subject to approval by the Secretary of War. 1
Independence of decision, then, is also concerned with an ex-
ternal threat to the execution of the judicial task, but it can only
be secured, in the end, through the living, day-to-day adherence
to its principle by legislators and executives. As the Ex parte Mer-
ryman42 case from the Civil War shows, even the most vigorous
assertion of judicial authority is meaningless in the teeth of an
executive willing and able to ignore a court's decision.43 The same
could be said, I believe, about legislation that ignores a settled
judicial understanding of the Constitution. The external guaranty
of the courts' independence of decision lies in the settled under-
standing, among government officials, the legal profession, and
the citizenry as a whole, about the authority of judicial decrees.
And that external understanding to be efficacious must be subjec-
tive-an internalized attitude about our system.
The third element that I believe is woven into the general con-
cept of judicial independence is what I am calling independence of
thought. The courts are only truly independent, our tradition has
maintained, when the judges reach their conclusions through a
process of thought and decision that is significantly different from
the forms of decisionmaking the other branches of government
employ. The function of adjudication involves by definition the
exercise of a type of judgment that proceeds from different prem-
ises and operates within different constraints than those which
characterize the activities of the legislature and the executive.
This idea was truly universal in the founding era. To take only
one of a myriad of examples, in his 1793 Kamper opinion, St.
George Tucker wrote that "it is the province of the legislature to
make, and of the executive to enforce obedience to the laws,"
41. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
42. 17 F.Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
43. In the Merryman case, Chief Justice Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus at the
petition of a man being held in military custody on the suspicion of being a secessionist.
Id. at 147. The officers with custody of Merryman, acting under presidential order, de-
clined to obey the writ despite Taney's ruling that President Lincoln's suspension of ha-
beas corpus was unauthorized under Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution.
Id. at 148.
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while the judiciary's "office" is that of "expounding" the laws.44
Judges who fail to maintain and respect the difference between
judicial and extrajudicial reasoning are not independent in the
American constitutional sense, no matter how secure their posi-
tions and how respected their judgments, for those judgments will
then necessarily be subservient to something other than the peo-
ple's law. Through their failure to maintain their independence of
thought, such judges will lack that "strictest responsibility" to the
people from which Tucker said that "a judge is no more ex-
empt.., than any other servant of the people, according to the
true principles of the constitution."45 A good early example of this
independence in action can be found in Justice William Paterson's
opinion in the 1798 case of Calder v. Bull,46 where Paterson ex-
plained why, as a judge, working within the constraints of judicial
thought, he could not read a constitutional provision to address a
grave political evil which, in his opinion, the Constitution ought
to address.47
Unlike the independences of position and decision, then, inde-
pendence of thought is not directed at ensuring the proper re-
sponsibility of the courts to the people by protecting their person-
nel and judgments against external threat. Independence of
thought is concerned with the internal threat to judicial responsi-
bility posed by the judges' own predispositions, beliefs, and com-
mitments. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, the founding
generation was well aware of the role such subjective factors play
in coming to conclusions on legal issues, and not only when criti-
cizing decisions and judges a given Founder did not like! As John
Marshall wrote about the great question of the national bank,
"It]he judgment is... much influenced by the wishes, the affec-
44. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 79 (1793).
45. 1 TUCKER, supra note 15, app. at 359.
46. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
47. Id. at 397 (Paterson, J., seriatim opinion).
I had an ardent desire to have extended the provision in the Constitution
to retrospective laws in general. There is neither policy nor safety in such
laws; and, therefore, I have always had a strong aversion against them. It
may, in general, be truly observed of retrospective laws of every descrip-
tion, that they neither accord with sound legislation, nor the fundamental
principles of the social compact. But on full consideration, I am convinced,
that ex post facto laws must be limited in the manner already expressed;
they must be taken in their technical, which is also their common and
general acceptation, and are not to be understood in their literal sense.
[Vol. 38:603
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tions, and the general theories" of those who must come to an an-
swer." Constitutional questions, to be sure, may be particularly
likely to intersect with a judge's theories, but Marshall's state-
ment points to a general truth, which is that nothing external
prevents a judge from "exercis[ing] WILL instead of
JUDGMENT," as Hamilton put it in The Federalist.49 The guar-
anty of judicial independence in this regard must lie, finally, in
the judges' own adherence to a conception of their function that
distinguishes it from that of a legislator or executive officer. Here
too, however, there is an external as well as a subjective element,
for we cannot long expect independence of thought on the part of
our judges unless our schools of law, our profession, and the citi-
zenry at large see courts as something other than a third set of
policymakers.
IV. CONCLUSION
This then is my claim to you, that in the American legal tradi-
tion, as classically formulated during the founding era, the con-
cept of judicial independence encompasses three distinct ele-
ments-the three independences of position, decision, and
thought. All are necessary to ensure that the courts, in their
proper manner, act under that strict responsibility to the people,
which is the shared obligation of all three branches of govern-
ment under a free constitution. The Founders thought it axio-
matic that all governmental power must be exercised with a due
responsibility to the people: as Hamilton put it in 1791, it is the
"republican maxim, that all government is a delegation of
power."5 The agent must be subordinate to the principal. And
they further agreed that governmental institutions should be
structured so as to create external incentives to that end-hence,
among other devices, judicial independence of position. But the
Founders did not think governmental structures operate me-
chanically. It is living, flesh and blood human beings with indi-
vidual minds, hearts, and wills who must decide how to respond
48. 4 JOHN MARSHALL, GEORGE WASHINGTON 243 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed.,
Chelsea House 1983) (1805).
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 6, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton).
50. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a
Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 45 (Jefferson Powell ed., 1991).
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to incentives, and so external structures also ought to foster the
appropriate internal and subjective attitudes toward whatever
constitutional function a given official must carry out. Recall
Hamilton's comment about the desirability of "beget[ting] or for-
tify[ing]" a certain "temper in the courts."51 The three independ-
ences of position, decision, and thought converge on the goal of
making it possible-more than possible, of making it likely-for
judges to carry out their function of adjudication independently of
the distortions of influence, futility, or self-will. The extent to
which each independence can be safeguarded through external
guaranties varies, but none can achieve their goal unless the
judges themselves cultivate a certain temper in the execution of
their office.
But this necessity and obligation, as I've already suggested in
discussing the independence of decision, does not rest on judges
alone. In a world in which we as the legal profession-and the
broader we that is the American people-do not understand the
judicial function as distinct from that of other parts of govern-
ment, we cannot expect our judges to enjoy or act upon these in-
dependences of position, decision, and thought. Judicial inde-
pendence, as we have traditionally understood it, will not long
survive unless we in the legal profession-and the much broader
we that is the American people-understand and respect it.
51. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 6, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton).
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